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Abstract—In contrast to ASICs, hardware Trojans can poten-
tially be injected into FPGA designs post-manufacturing by bit-
stream alteration. Hardware Trojans which target cryptographic
primitives are particularly interesting for an adversary because a
weakened primitive can lead to a complete loss of system security.
One problem an attacker has to overcome is the identification
of cryptographic primitives in a large bitstream with unknown
semantics. As the first contribution, we demonstrate that AES
can be algorithmically identified in a look-up table-level design
for a variety of implementation styles. Our graph-based approach
considers AES implementations which are created using several
synthesis and technology mapping options. As the second con-
tribution, we present and discuss the drawbacks of a dynamic
obfuscation countermeasure which allows for the configuration
of certain crucial parts of a cryptographic primitive after the
algorithm has been loaded into the FPGA. As a result, reverse-
engineering and modifying a primitive in the bitstream is more
challenging.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major security issue for SRAM-based FPGAs is the
external storage of the FPGA bitstream. Recent work has
shown that bitstream encryption is not impervious to attack
[1], and with sufficient effort, the logical function of any
FPGA design can be reverse-engineered from a decrypted
bitstream, even though the bitstream configuration mapping
is proprietary. With the goal of weakening system secu-
rity, the next hurdle for an adversary is the identification
of the cryptographic algorithm within the target third-party
design. Instantiations of cryptographic primitives such as the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or Data Encryption
Standard (DES) implement specific non-linear and key-based
operations. As previously shown [2], this regularity provides
a mechanism for locating the logic that corresponds to the
primitives even in very large logic-level netlists.
In this contribution, we show that there are more general
methods available beyond those shown in previous work,
which was based on identifying the specific output values of
S-Box tables [2]. We introduce a graph-matching approach
which can be used to identify look-up table (LUT) and flip-
flop-based implementations of cryptographic primitives. Our
method is effective for AES cores synthesized using a wide
variety of mapping options (area-optimized, delay-optimized,
etc.) and it is FPGA architecture independent.
As the second main contribution of this paper, we present
a dynamic obfuscation countermeasure which reduces the risk
of detection of the crucial, non-linear S-Box layer through
automatic and static reverse-engineering. Our approach relies
upon a partial self-configuration of the S-Box layer after the
FPGA bitstream is loaded, rendering specific modification of
S-Boxes in the bitstream ineffective.
II. AES IDENTIFICATION IN LUT-LEVEL NETLISTS
To motivate our approach of a post-bitstream-load self-
configuring AES core, we demonstrate that it is possible to
identify static AES cores in large LUT-based FPGA designs
in an algorithmic manner, regardless of the synthesis approach
used to create the LUT-based design or the size of the design.
This type of static analysis mimics the possible actions of an
attacker looking to locate and afterwards manipulate the AES
functionality in a LUT-based netlist. In our approach, we make
the following two assumptions regarding the target netlist: first,
the third-party design may contain other elements and not
solely the AES. Second, the AES is implemented using LUTs
and flip-flops as well as precomputed S-Box tables. Further,
we assume that the attacker has access to the netlist (through
bitstream reverse-engineering), but has no information regard-
ing the pre-synthesis RTL or high-level implementation of the
AES core. Also, no information is available to the attacker
regarding the synthesis tool or synthesis parameters used to
create the LUT-based design.
Our graph-based algorithm uses a LUT-level, third-party
netlist as input and attempts to locate subgraphs which
represent portions of AES combinational logic functionality.
Combinational logic in the input design between primary
inputs/flip-flop outputs (CI) and primary outputs/flip-flop in-
puts (CO) is represented as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG).
The algorithm first determines the support (DAG input CIs)
for each flip-flop input (CO). Flip-flops which have a matching
support are grouped into registers. A backward DAG traversal
is then initiated from each register CO to locate logic cones.
The combinational logic within each cone is matched against
known combinational subfunctions identified in an AES core
(e.g., XOR, S-Boxes) in an attempt to isolate the core.
To illustrate the capabilities of our graph search for AES
primitives, the algorithm was implemented in C and used to
assess netlists generated using the open-source VTR flow1
including ODIN II register-transfer synthesis, ABC logic syn-
thesis, and VPR place and route.
Library and design setup: In an initial step, a library
of synthesized common internal AES transformations was
created. ODIN II and ABC were used to synthesize these
1https://code.google.com/p/vtr-verilog-to-routing/
functions (variants of XORs and 8-input, 1-output func-
tions representing partial S-Box functionality) into And-
Inverter Graphs (AIGs). The library functions were subse-
quently written as a series of independent files in BLIF
format. Subsequently, an open source RTL version of AES-
128 from OpenCores2 was embedded within RTL versions
of four VTR benchmarks (ch_intrinsics, mkDelayWorker32B,
mkSMAdapter4B, and sterovision0). Each design was syn-
thesized with ODIN II and ABC to interconnected collec-
tions of 6-LUTs and flip-flops using three different synthesis
ABC scripts: resyn/resyn2 (default, timing-optimized), com-
press/compress2 (area-driven), and rwsat (SAT-based). These
synthesized designs represent the type of LUT-based netlists
an attacker would be able to obtain via reverse-engineering.
TABLE I: AES subgraph search results. The S-Box column
detection indicates the number of 8-input, 1-output S-Box
components identified during the search (datapath components
/ key schedule components) out of (128/32) possible. LUT
counts synthesized with resyn are shown in parentheses.
Design Synth. S-Box Column Sub- Overall BM
script Detection graphs time (s) time (s)
aes resyn 124/32 252,810 249.57 223.56
compr 111/28 207,030 208.19 186.17
rwsat 128/32 284,170 265.65 239.93
ch_ resyn 124/32 487,530 957.48 916.33
intrinsics compr 111/28 363,760 462.95 428.04
(7,560) rwsat 128/32 459,830 567.43 526.43
mkSM- resyn 124/32 644,760 528.13 405.26
Adapter4B compr 111/28 604,000 499.11 376.83
(9,480) rwsat 128/32 695,890 537.98 418.87
mkDelay- resyn 124/32 1,082,370 977.62 580.95
Worker32b compr 111/28 1,018,050 1020.21 618.07
(12,060) rwsat 127/32 1,070,830 963.89 576.46
stereo- resyn 124/32 1,150,870 3485.93 793.83
vision0 compr 111/28 1,104,550 3670.51 802.80
(18,510) rwsat 128/32 1,253,420 3488.30 812.37
Search algorithm: Our search algorithm, which was inte-
grated into ABC, operates in a series of search steps. First, the
LUT-level netlist is read and combinational logic is flattened
into a series of AIGs. The support for each CO is determined
via a backward netlist traversal from the CO to CIs. Flip-
flops with a greater than 50% overlap in support for more than
eight inputs are grouped into registers. A series of searches
are then initiated from each register flip-flop to identify logic
cones with k-inputs. The combinational function of each cone
is compared against stored library functions of k-inputs to
identify matches (e.g., XOR, S-Box functionality). If a match
is identified, each cone input is used as the starting point
for the generation of additional cones and additional match
operations. The graph search for a cone is terminated when
logic depth of the cone (in terms of 2-input AND gates)
exceeds depth d = 25 (the upper limit logic depth of an AES
S-Box) or all CIs are reached.
Boolean matching: A key aspect of our function search
approach is the use of Boolean matching. Since the input
order of candidate cones may differ from the ordering in the
2http://opencores.org/project,aes_core
stored library version, it is necessary to assess the combina-
tional equivalence of the graphs under a collection of input
permutations (p-equivalence). Our approach uses a Boolean
matching algorithm integrated into ABC [3].
Our graph identification approach was applied to a syn-
thesized and LUT-mapped AES core and the four VTR with
embedded AES benchmarks mentioned in this section. Three
synthesized versions of the five benchmarks using the scripts
mentioned earlier were analyzed. The same library of common
AES transformations was used for the five analyses. In all
cases, all XOR gates used for the AddRoundKey transforma-
tions were identified along with components of all twenty
8-input, 8-output S-Boxes present in the AES core3. The
results of our approach are summarized in Table I. The S-
Box detection results are reported in terms of the number of
8-input, 1-output S-Box components that were identified in
the design for the AES datapath (out of 128 = 8 ·16 possible)
and the key schedule (out of 32 = 8 · 4 possible). Regardless
of the synthesis script used to create the initial design, it was
possible to identify almost all individual S-Box components.
Boolean matching (BM) time is included in the search overall
time in the table.
III. PARTIAL SELF-CONFIGURATION AS PROTECTION
Once (parts of) the AES have been identified in a third-
party design, an algorithm substitution attack [4] can be
launched in order to weaken the cipher. Altering the S-Box
layer is attractive, because it is identifiable in an algorithmic
manner, cf. Section II and, crucially, manipulating it does not
require any re-routing efforts. The practical feasibility of an
S-Box substitution attack, with a particular focus on third-
party FPGA designs, has been shown recently for AES and
DES by Swierczynski et al. [2]. If the S-Boxes are maliciously
altered in the bitstream, the cryptographic key can be leaked or
the resulting ciphertext can directly be decrypted using trivial
cryptanalysis. Such a modification of the FPGA configuration
exhibits a serious problem for real-world applications where
encryption and decryption are performed by the same device,
e.g., by a USB flash drive.
Attacker Model: We only consider static attacks which
attempt to identify and alter precomputed AES S-Boxes. To
be more precise, no potential round counter, state machine, or
data transfer modifications, etc. are considered in this work.
The strategy behind our countermeasure is to significantly
increase the reverse-engineering efforts for an attacker (us-
ing static analysis) who intends to mount such an S-Box
substitution attack, as described above. Our raise the bar
countermeasure hides the precomputed S-Box values in a
cryptographic manner, thus an attacker is not able to easily
detect and modify any S-Box value in a predictable fashion.
Key Idea of the S-Box Protection: The main idea of
our approach is to first instantiate a modified AES core with
random and bijective S-Boxes. After the FPGA has been ini-
tially configured, the random S-Boxes are dynamically updated
3Round-based AES design with 16 S-Boxes for the state transformation
(datapath) and 4 S-Boxes for the key schedule operation.
(through encryption4 with the altered AES) to the correct
AES S-Boxes to achieve proper encryption and decryption
behavior. Thus, the correct S-Box values are only dynamically
available and cryptographically hidden for an attacker who
only statically analyzes the design and searches for the correct
AES S-Boxes.
During the system design phase, the correct AES S-Boxes
are decrypted with the initial modified AES. The resulting
ciphertexts are stored in the distributed LUT memory of the
FPGA design. Note that the ciphertexts may be more easily
identified if they are stored in the block memory and not in the
FPGA’s distributed memory. The ciphertext bits are distributed
over multiple LUTs and hence identification and reverse-
engineering seem more challenging (compared to block mem-
ory) for an attacker using static analysis. After FPGA power-
up, the design starts to recover and replace the random S-
Boxes with the correct ones by encryption of the ciphertexts
(decrypted correct S-Boxes). Once the reconfiguration phase
is finished, the valid AES can be used to encrypt and decrypt
data. To implement our proposed countermeasure, we make
use of dynamic look-up tables that can be changed during
runtime of the FPGA, i.e., only by the FPGA configuration
itself. Additionally, we implemented an AES design using
block memory to support smaller FPGA devices.
Dynamic LUT reconfiguration is used as a building block
for our countermeasure. This feature is supported by several
Xilinx FPGA families, in particular we implemented the
protection scheme utilizing a Spartan 6 Xilinx FPGA device.
Building Block, Xilinx CFGLUT5: Xilinx provides a
dynamic LUT primitive called CFGLUT5 (5-input, 1-output
LUT).
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Fig. 1: Dynamic reconfiguration of a CFGLUT5 primitive
Fig. 1a illustrates the initial state of a CFGLUT5 (directly
after FPGA power-up and initial configuration), while Fig. 1b
depicts the reconfigured state. The finit Boolean function
output values are encoded in the FPGA bitstream, whereas the
Boolean function output values of f are reconfigured during
runtime.
Reconfiguration of CFGLUT5 Elements: Three input recon-
figuration pins are available for this hardware element. The
CDI pin handles the new LUT content data or functionality.
The CE pin needs to be pulled high to activate or keep the
reconfiguration process running. The clock is used to configure
the current data of the CDI pin. The 5-input Boolean function
f is coded by 25 = 32 output values that are being shifted
4Note that the decryption function may/must not be available in the FPGA
design, e.g., due to the implemented mode of operation or the system setting.
bit-wise for updating the functionality. Two output pins are
provided by the CFGLUT5: through the CDO pin, the old
configuration data can be read out and the other output pin
provides the image of the Boolean function f .
Memory Organization: In the case of AES, an S-Box in-
stance can be implemented using 2048 = 28 ·8 bits of memory.
Thus, 64 = 204832 CFGLUT5 primitives are used and connected
together in a consecutive chain, cf. the lower part of Fig. 2. As
all 64 units are consecutively connected together over an 1-bit
data bus, 2048 clock cycles are required to reconfigure all S-
Box instances. To be more precise, one AES 8-input, 1-output
S-Box column is divided into 8 individual 5-input, 1-output
subfunctions. We denote by Sji (x), the i
th S-Box column and
the jth subfunction (implemented in the CFGLUT5 elements).
For each S-Box column i, all subfunctions (S1i (x), . . . , S
8
i (x))
have to be multiplexed using the remaining input bits, i.e., x8,
x7, and x6 in Fig. 2.
As previously discussed in this section, we require a
random and bijective AES S-Box denoted by S˜(x) in the
following. This S-Box S˜(x) is the initial Boolean function
of all CFGLUT5 units (and thus available in the proprietary
bitstream configuration mapping). This slightly modified AES
core (using the random S-Box S˜(x)) is denoted by A˜ES. In
the following, each step from system design to FPGA power-
up is described to present the concept in its entirety.
Phase I – System Design: During the system design phase,
the following steps have to be carried out: first, a random and
bijective 8-input, 8-output S-Box S˜(x) and its inverse S˜−1(x)
have to be generated. Then, a so-called reconfiguration key
k1 has to be generated and the correct AES S-Box values
(256 bytes) have to be decrypted with A˜ES
−1
k1 (whose S-Box
is replaced by the random and bijective S-Box S˜(x)). To be
more precise, the S-Box plaintext is computed as follows:
c˜i := A˜ES
−1
k1 (p˜i), i = 1, 2, . . . , 16
A 128-bit input p˜i (the original AES S-Box S(x) divided into
its columns and subfunctions) is defined as follows (the ||
denotes the concatenation of a 32-bit value):
p˜i :=
S
1
d i2e(x) || S
2
d i2e(x) || S
3
d i2e(x) || S
4
d i2e(x) i odd
S5d i2e(x) || S
6
d i2e(x) || S
7
d i2e(x) || S
8
d i2e(x) i even
The S-Box S(x) is represented in the above manner, so that it
can be directly loaded into the CFGLUT5 FPGA elements.
Fig. 2 provides a detailed overview of the inner workings
of our dynamic AES core. Note that the encryption function
A˜ESk1 is initially implemented in the FPGA design.
Phase II – FPGA Power-Up: The following steps are
performed to dynamically recover the valid AES core, directly
after the FPGA power up. First, the 16 ciphertext blocks c˜i
are encrypted by p˜i := A˜ESk1(c˜i) to recover the valid AES
S-Box values. Second, all S˜(x) instances are dynamically
reconfigured to S(x) (utilizing the values p˜i) from the previous
step. After this process, the A˜ES core turns into the correct
AES core. Finally, the reconfiguration key k1 is set to the
data encryption key k2.
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Fig. 2: Dynamic reconfiguration of AES S-Boxes using CFG-
LUT5 elements
We now examine the performance and utilized hardware
area of our dynamically reconfigurable AES core. We im-
plemented a dynamic DES core based on the reconfiguration
scheme (using the same method as outlined for AES). Corre-
sponding implementation results are also provided.
Backwards Compatibility: Since not all Xilinx FPGA fam-
ilies support dynamic CFGLUT5 elements, we also imple-
mented a similar approach for AES and DES that instantiates
S-Boxes using block RAM instead of dynamic LUTs. Due
to similarity with the LUT-based scheme, the block RAM
implementation is not further explained, although its resource
usage is provided.
For performance and hardware area evaluation we used the
same synthesis options (using Xilinx ISE 13.2) for each FPGA
implementation and verified the functionality on a Spartan 6
FPGA board (SP601 evaluation kit with a XC6SLX16). We
compared three different implementation strategies: (unpro-
tected) static S-Boxes in LUTs, (protected) S-Boxes instan-
tiated in CFGLUT5 memory, and (protected) S-Boxes instan-
tiated in block RAM. The results are depicted in Table II.
The amount of utilized slices, LUTs and flip-flops, etc. refer
to a single instantiation of one AES / DES core. Each design
contains a UART core due to the communication interface that
is required for verification.
TABLE II: Static LUT-based / dynamic DES and AES designs
Design #Slices #FFs #LUTs #RAMBs fmax
6-to-1 5-to-1 Sh-Reg. 8 16 (MHz)
DES
Static LUT 142 341 374 52 1 – – 165
Dyn. CFGLUT5 1005 4570 2480 1125 138 – – 183
Dyn. BRAM 218 495 313 186 – 8 2 156
AES
Static LUT 1256 1619 3410 332 1 – – 203
Dyn. CFGLUT5 1371 4065 1848 1376 1130 – – 211
Dyn. BRAM 451 1444 1234 346 1 16 4 238
The performance of the AES and DES implementations
varies moderately. The large amount of flip-flops and shift
registers in the dynamic CFGLUT5 designs (compared to the
static LUT-based and block RAM designs) is based on the
interconnections of all CFGLUT5 units for AES and DES.
IV. CAUTIONARY NOTES ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC
IMPLEMENTATIONS IN FPGA BITSTREAMS
As stated earlier, if the bitstream encryption scheme (if
available at all) can be overcome with moderate effort, a
design’s integrity and confidentiality is no longer certain, even
if the bitstream configuration mapping is proprietary. The
reverse-engineering of an FPGA netlist (that was obtained
through bitstream reverse-engineering) is less explored in the
research community and thus real-world attacker capabilities
are unclear. As shown in this work, algorithmic detection of
cryptographic S-Boxes and XOR operations is feasible, hence
a reverse-engineer can use this information as an entry point
of his FPGA design analysis. To further impede algorithm
substitution attacks, a memory access control unit could be
implemented that analyzes the written memory content to raise
the bar for an S-Box replacement attempt. By extension of
the attacker model, several other vulnerabilities might occur
in our scheme. A static analysis might allow for the identifi-
cation and modification of the random S-Box layer. Also, a
stronger attacker might modify the reconfiguration circuitry.
Both strategies would lead to an unwanted key extraction.
Thus, we recommend the implementation of selftest circuitry
that adds further protection to the system. Future research
should explore how a cryptographic design can be obfuscated
such that automatic detection of primitives is challenging
and hence hardware Trojan insertion, e.g., through algorithm
substitution, becomes a time consuming task for an adversary.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we briefly described a protection approach for
cryptographic primitives, such as AES and DES, to defend
against simple and static bitstream S-Box layer manipulations.
The S-Boxes in an AES core are configured after bitstream
loading, as a partial defense against Trojan insertion in the
bitstream. To motivate our approach, we show that it is
algorithmically possible to identify standard AES cores in
LUT-based designs by means of static analysis, even if the
attacker has no information about the original RTL design or
the synthesis parameters used to create the LUT-based design.
The security limitations of our raise the bar approach are also
briefly analyzed.
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